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Turnkey Tyranny? Struggles for a New Digital Order 
Thorsten Thiel 
‘Bingo,’ Jolu said. ‘I’m not saying it wasn’t terrible in the 
Great Depression or whatever. But we’ve got the power to 
organize like we’ve never had before. And the creeps and 
the spooks have the power to spy on us more than ever 
before, to control us and censor us and find us and snatch 
us.’ 
‘Who’s going to win?’ I said. ‘I mean, I used to think that 
we’d win, because we understand computers and they 
don’t.’ 
‘Oh, they understand computers. And they’re doing 
everything they can to invent new ways to mess you up with 
them. But if we leave the field, it’ll just be them. People who 
want everything, want to be in charge of everyone.’ 
(Cory Doctorow, Homeland) 
Over the last two decades, the establishment of  the Internet as a global mass medium, the 
increased economic importance of  information and communications technology (ICT), and the 
almost total replacement of  analogue methods of  information-processing by digital ones have 
changed modern societies more profoundly and more rapidly than has any previous 
technological advance. Networking and digital communication now pervade every area of  life. As 
a consequence, the political management of  the Internet, both as a piece of  technical 
infrastructure and as a communicatively constituted ‘cyberspace,’ has also gained in importance. 
Although the ‘hands-off ’ approaches that were seen as an appropriate way of  working—or 
indeed the only way of  working—in the early stages of  digital development now have very few 
supporters, the process of  creating a new digital order is far from complete: norm formation on 
the Net is a hotly disputed process; power relations between different political institutions and 
social actors are extremely unclear; and the area as a whole is riddled with fault lines. 
One thing that can be observed, however, is the emergence of  a battle-front running between 
one (admittedly very diversely constituted) bloc comprising private business and national and 
international politics and another consisting of  a very vocal group of  Internet activists. The first 
bloc has the greater share of  power-resources at its disposal, but achievement of  a hegemonial 
position, in the Gramscian sense of  the production of  ideas capable of  commanding consent, 
seems so far to have been denied it. In fact, the increase in regulatory ambitions has resulted in 
Internet activists banding together to form a counterforce and this in turn has led to attempts to 
exclude them as dissidents. Control-oriented practices—such as criminalisation and 
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surveillance—have burgeoned, and on the dissident side this has in turn lent plausibility to 
dystopian accounts of  the new order and fuelled the tendency of  activists to portray what they 
do as freedom-loving. 
In what follows here, I shall reconstruct this growth in Internet control and the stages of  
resistance to it. I shall begin by describing the evolution of  the new order, its main drivers and 
characteristics, and I shall then correlate this with the emergence of  dissidence and its various 
manifestations. My thesis is that in the wide-ranging policy-area of  digitalisation, dissidence has 
found a particularly conducive setting for its operations and that thanks to the open starting-
position and an astute use of  the expanding protest-repertoire, it has managed to generate 
considerable public interest. Many forms of  digital dissidence—at least in the West—are viewed 
as legitimate, and this despite the attempts made to criminalise them. But to what extent 
politicisation and dissident practice will succeed in countering the fundamental trend towards the 
establishment of  an order regulating Internet architecture and cyberspace, remains to be seen. 
This is because in the current hybrid regulatory structure there is no coherent, authoritative 
power capable of  responding to general issues, with the result that, even where there is a high 
degree of  acceptance in the public discourse, this does not translate directly into political 
decisions. 
The emergence of  order and the shaping of  governance on the Internet 
In order to be able to make sense of the struggles over order that characterise an increasingly 
digitalised world, we first have to understand the ‘beating heart’ of that world—namely, the 
Internet and the manner of its organisation. The Internet can initially best be understood, 
technically speaking, as a protocol that allows networks to link up with other networks, and 
computers with other computers.i From this perspective, the history of the Internet is, at the 
basic level, the story of how a standard was developed and diffused, making it possible for 
technical devices to communicate with each other and providing a substructure onto which more 
and more services were built (one such is the World Wide Web, which is now widely regarded as 
synonymous with the Internet) (Leiner et al. 2011). Because these standards of exchange and 
communication—in other words, Internet protocols—are intrinsically ‘dumb’ (in the sense that 
they merely facilitate the transfer of data and say nothing about the latter’s content), and because 
of the boundless versatility of the architecture built on to this system, there is no fixed authority 
operating beyond the level of data-normalisation. Anyone can communicate with anyone via the 
network; it is only the end-user devices that process the content. But if this is so, how can 
communication be ordered? 
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To answer this question, we need to distinguish between (1) the technical dimension and (2) the 
content-related dimension of the Internet as a space for communication. We then need to 
demonstrate, for each dimension, how ordering processes are set in motion there. 
(1) At the technical level, it is in regard to the previously mentioned enforcement and 
universalisation of standards that regulatory mechanisms are having to be established and pushed 
through against alternatives—such as the closed ‘Minitel’ system in France and AOL’s scheme to 
set up an ‘internet within the Internet.’ Infrastructure providers in particular—these include 
phone companies and content providers—are continually seeking to create an Internet that is 
less versatile but more commodifiable.ii But the exponential growth of the Net would hardly 
have been possible without the system’s open structure—the feature most often cited as the 
reason for the Net’s irresistible rise and currently the basis that is allowing ever more devices to 
link up with one another and communicate autonomously (Internet of Things). In this sense, 
connectivity is now largely a given and regulated consensually—though the increase in the 
number of functions dependent on data-transfer via the Internet brings with it an ongoing need 
for accommodation. 
Even this seemingly purely technical development, however, has a political dimension. This 
becomes evident when one looks at the decision-making involved in establishing and refining 
standards. The major role which educational establishments and the military played at the outset 
in the development of the Internet clearly points to early state influence in this area. However, 
this influence did not translate into a state-dominated decision-making system. Instead, a highly 
differentiated, hybrid structure grew up, in which the emphasis was on expertise-based 
legitimation. Commercial actors such as Internet service providers and hardware developers (and 
later also content providers and Internet-based suppliers of services) have always played a major 
part in the cooperative structures of Internet governance. This does not mean, however, that the 
state is disappearing from the scene—in fact it currently looks to be making a comeback 
(DeNardis 2013, Drezner 2004, Hofmann 2009). 
Even more importantly, however, the neutrality that has been inferred from the Internet’s 
technocratic, cooperation-based set-up has increasingly revealed itself to be an illusion. Technical 
decisions can have highly political effects and at the same time as the importance of these 
decisions is growing in the modern world, acceptance of the technocratic bodies that take them 
is declining. As a result, over the last few years the governance institutions that regulate the 
technical aspects of the infrastructure have been increasingly called into question and currently 
find themselves in a state of upheaval. The experiments with multi-stakeholder arrangements are 
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regarded in many quarters as having failed, and states in particular—Russia and China, for 
example—have woken up to the challenge and are trying to institute a different kind of Internet-
management that would give them a tighter hold on technical decisions (DeNardis 2009, 2014, 
Ebert/Maurer 2013). iii  In line with this, options for control and filtering are becoming an 
increasingly important focus of interest—not only for these actors, but also (for different 
reasons) for liberal states and Internet services. This has led, overall, to the Internet’s technical 
infrastructure being thought of as something other than a domain of hierarchical intervention 
and has resulted in the creation, or political exploitation, of “points of control” (DeNardis 2012, 
Benkler 2016, Zittrain 2003).iv 
(2) The second level at which digital communication has experienced a consistent push in the 
direction of order-formation is that of ‘content,’ in other words in regard to the regulation of 
communication and/or the policing of cyberspace. 
In this connection, the argument that because of the specifics of digital communication, the 
Internet is a ‘regulation averse’ space was long regarded as compelling. It was assumed that in 
order to be able to assert its statehood, the state must be in a position to make full use of its 
‘traditional’ instruments—the law, controls, and sanctions—and that these, in turn, were based 
on clearly defined systems of accountability, hierarchies, and territorial spheres. But these 
realities, it was argued, were cast into doubt by digital communication—by the extensive 
opportunities it offered for anonymous activity, by the possibility of individual, loss-free and 
(largely) cost-free duplication of content, and by the territorial indeterminacy of data-flows. In 
combination, so ran the argument, all this would permanently undermine any attempt at 
regulation via the law.v What this early debate overlooked, however, was that there are numerous 
functional equivalents to direct control (filters, for example, or control through intermediaries). 
Eventually classic state sovereignty was not only restored; it actually gained in strength and 
intensity (Goldsmith/Wu 2006, Thiel 2014b). 
There are in fact numerous ways in which digital communication—even allowing for its 
enduring peculiarities—can be regulated by government and business. As part of this process, 
controls that need to be applied to data-flows for technical reasons are increasingly mutating into 
surveillance of those flows (meaning examination of their content and prioritisation or tracking 
of particular communications) (Sprenger 2015). What is more, over time the possibilities of 
doing this on a permanent basis have increased yet further because infrastructure changes (see 
above), big data, and algorithmic processes have greatly reduced the problems of capacity 
hampering legal enforcement and control. Thanks to the rise of the mobile Internet, for example, 
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it has become much easier to pinpoint communications geographically, and nowadays the 
content of digital communication is much more frequently captured and classified in transit 
(Bendrath/Mueller 2011). 
Even more important than these state endeavours to keep a grip on communications-content is 
the comprehensive commercialisation of the Net. The Internet is now one of the most important 
drivers of economic productivity; it pervades every aspect of economic and social life and in 
developed states it is the means by which a hefty proportion of the gross national product is 
generated. One of the major features of actual money-making on the Internet is its reliance on 
the generation and collection of data. In addition, both in the telecommunications sector (i.e. 
among Internet providers) and in the information economy, there are signs of a trend towards 
monopolisation. This arises from the obvious expediency of economies of scale in the case of 
digital goods—as when, for example, search algorithms become more efficient precisely as a 
result of being used by large numbers of people (Tufekci 2016). 
There are at least three ways in which commercialisation and increased economic importance 
have created political incentives for a more thoroughgoing regulation of the Internet. First, the 
growth in importance of digital communication has upped the requirements in regard to 
regulation. This is evident, for example, in the area of security, where the individual notion of 
computer safety has increasingly morphed into the all-encompassing notion of cyber security. 
Centrality is here translated into vulnerability and this is used as justification for state 
intervention (Nissenbaum 2005, Hansen/Nissenbaum 2009). Secondly, being a force that sets in 
motion global, communication-enabling processes of exchange, the Internet has triggered the 
desire, on the part of many states, to impose controls in relation to particular social discourses. 
Motives here may range from, at one end, the wish to safeguard cultural specifics or the freedom 
of expression of particular social groups and, at the other, fear of political criticism. Thirdly, the 
mass collection of data by business also entices states to write access to these stocks of 
information into their own regulatory practice. From this point of view, the task which states 
currently face in regard to regulatory management of the Net is totally different from that which 
they faced even twenty years ago. And it is a task they have set about tackling with 
determination—if not always with unqualified success. 
The quest to get a policy implemented on the Net that is both effective and as consistent as 
possible with regulation in the ‘offline world’ is being pursued not only at the political and legal 
level, but also in relation to coding and technical infrastructure. Attempts are constantly being 
made, for example, to align the Internet more closely to the logic of territorial sovereignty 
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(Mueller 2015). Examples here range from China’s sealing-off and censoring of the Internet, 
through Britain’s blanket filtering of Net content, to ‘soft interventions’ such as the German 
endeavour to get Facebook to apply rules on hate speech. Another facet of developments here is 
the attempt to increase the extent to which Internet communication is classified and organised 
automatically, a measure which, in turn, necessitates the collection of data by private and/or 
public bodies (‘data retention’) and drives moves against earlier Web standards such as those on 
anonymity. 
This brief account of developments indicates how and in which areas order is being formed in 
regard to digital issues. Overall, we can safely say there is a marked increase in the extent of 
regulation. Commercial and state actors are contributing in equal measure to this 
intensification—though there may sometimes be profound differences of opinion and conflicts 
of interest between, or indeed within, these groups of actors, depending on the context or 
subject-matter. The planned aspects of rule-making and sovereign control are not the only 
significant factors here. Of equal importance are non-intended effects—for example, the shifting 
configuration of the incentive-structure for data-collection, which is bringing about an 
exponential increase in the generation and linkage of data and is thus itself prompting new calls 
for order and rules. 
All in all, it is clear that economic and technical developments are being secured and 
strengthened through a process of  juridification and regulation. In this connection, it serves no 
purpose to ask who is ultimately the key player in this multi-layered process, or to what extent 
the process is an intentional or directed one. What matters is that the process has clear 
winners—actors who occupy, and seek to extend, the resultant positions of  power. This 
threatens, in the medium to long term, to result in the closing-down of  the Internet’s open 
communications-structure (an unsurprising turn of  events when viewed in the broader historical 
context of  the development of  information and communications technologies: Wu 2010, Clark 
2016).vi 
Digital dissidence: Convictions and strategies 
We now have a rough outline of the way in which order and norms have taken shape in the 
digital sphere over the last few years. Unsurprisingly, this process has encountered resistance at 
many different levels—and has done so in particular because networks and digitalisation have a 
progressive and emancipatory connotation in public discourse and are associated with a whole 
raft of utopian aspirations (Thiel 2014a). The commercial and state-led reshaping of digital space 
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has thus been met with various acts of resistance and attempts to create alternative structures 
and it is to these that I shall turn my attention in what follows, first describing and then 
classifying them. 
Digital dissidence—by which I mean dissidence relating to digital issues rather than dissidence in 
general, made possible or promoted by digitalisation and networking—is undoubtedly on the 
increase. This is clear just on an anecdotal level: we are all familiar with the kinds of protests that 
have made headlines in recent years, often perceived, and talked of, as being highly revolutionary 
in their forms and concerns. Prominent players here include the WikiLeaks organisation, the 
activists from ‘Anonymous’ and the closely related ‘Lulzsec’ group—and, of course, the 
whistleblower Edward Snowden. Also of importance, however, are the protest actions mounted 
against norm-changes targeted specifically at Internet infrastructure. These include the global 
protests against SOPA, PIPA, and ACTA, which succeeded in blocking a complex international 
set of regulations backed by a number of powerful interests. At the national level too, it is 
possible to point to a whole host of high-profile cases: in Germany, for example, these included 
the opposition to web blocking, the demonstrations mounted by the Freiheit statt Angst (‘Freedom 
Not Fear’) alliance, the campaign on ancillary copyright, and the ‘treason’ controversy over the 
bloggers from netzpolitik.org. Key to the momentum of these debates is the prestige of a 
number of charismatic and media-savvy rallying-figures—from Aaron Swartz, through Julian 
Assange, to Edward Snowden—who have become household names (and, it has to be noted, are 
all male, as is so often the case in the technology sector). What are the distinguishing features of 
this resistance? What are the convictions that drive it and what are its different strategies and 
approaches? 
Convictions 
As far as conviction/ideological position is concerned, what strikes one in particular is that 
recognising a dissident stance is easier than specifying what lies at its ideological heart. Internet 
activism initially grew out of  a relatively large, now quite well-established and very vibrant 
subculture—a fact that is reflected in the wealth of  symbolic codes it uses (from cat-images to 
Guy Fawkes masks). By contrast, the politicisation of  Internet-related issues, the engagement 
with ‘high’ politics and representative institutions, the discourse with a broad social public, and 
the forging of  alliances are more recent developments and place heavy demands on a community 
which, though ideologically outspoken, is often vague and lacking in coherence.vii 
Nonetheless, it is possible, at an abstract level, to identify at least two overarching motifs running 
through the great majority of  cases of  digital dissidence. The first is the ideal of  free speech. 
Pre-Print (the final version differs slightly) 
Thorsten Thiel (2017): Turnkey Tyranny. Struggles for a New Digital Order. In: Gertheiss et. al: Resistance and 
Change in World Politics International Dissidence. Basingstoke, p. 215-242 
8 
 
Many activists take a liberal-to-libertarian line, combined, to varying degrees, with a participatory 
notion of  democracy. Politically speaking, therefore, many of  the stances adopted by cyber 
dissidents tally with democratic norms and practices as established in Western states, but what 
they frequently do is ‘radicalise’ those norms and reject their institutional embodiment and 
practical implementation.viii 
The second, directly related, motif  is the battle against surveillance. Here, the aspect of  freedom 
of  opinion and expression is, as it were, turned up a notch, in the sense that any form of  
surveillance or control is assumed to curtail freedom of  opinion and permanently hobble 
democracy. Criticism here is directed both at businesses and at states, but it is noticeable that, 
where businesses are targeted, the objections are not formulated in terms that are particularly 
critical of  capitalism (instead adopting a ‘consumer protection’ or ‘individual choice’ line), 
whereas when political power-formations, notably states, are the target, the criticism is voiced 
much more in terms of  principles (for example, little distinction is made between authoritarian 
and liberal regimes).ix 
When it comes to ideological motivation, however, what has to be remembered, overall, is that 
what unites the activists and guides the political actions is not an overarching political-cum-
ideological construct. Rather, actions are largely issue-led and are targeted at real-world 
developments that are seen as being off  course (the tightening-up of  copyright, for example, or 
web blocking, or various other concrete legislative schemes). Whereas activism in this area has 
traditionally been geared to technical issues, over the last few years general trends—from the 
expansion of  the security state to broader developments in democracy—have also begun to 
feature more prominently as triggers for these kinds of  activities.x Overall, this demonstrates the 
way in which digital dissidence is maturing—a process that is expressing itself  in the increased 
politicisation of  the movement and which, in turn, is being bolstered by the criminalisation of  
many of  the actions involved (see below). 
Strategies 
Even more indicative than ideological stance when it comes to identifying digital dissidence is 
the choice of strategies and means. And these themselves, in their turn, often have the effect of 
shaping or reinforcing identity—particularly since, in many protest-actions, the media 
preoccupation with means is just as important, if not more so, than the substance of the position 
taken. What, then, are the means and strategies employed by digital dissidents? 
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One important fact to note at the outset is that acts of dissidence are not the only response to 
have been triggered by the increasing politicisation of Internet policy. On the contrary, what one 
predominantly sees is a growth in, and professionalisation of, that section of civil society that 
takes an interest in Internet-related issues. Actors such as the European-based Chaos Computer 
Club (CCC), Digitale Gesellschaft, and iRights, and the US-based Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) only, or mostly, use strategies that would fall under the rubric of opposition 
(these range from participation in commissions of inquiry, through litigation, to the organisation 
of large-scale protests).xi In individual cases, these interventions have clearly been a success. This 
was spectacularly so with the blocking of SOPA, PIPA, and subsequently ACTA, but the actions 
against data retention or in favour of Internet neutrality have also scored considerable successes. 
Those involved have repeatedly managed to introduce even complex issues into the public 
discourse and frame them in line with their own convictions (Leifeld/Haunss 2012) give an 
empirical account of this process using the example of the campaign against software patents; 
see also Faris et al. 2015). In recent years, this type of opposition-politics has also shown itself 
open to alliance-building and has sometimes been pursued in close cooperation with parties and 
political institutions, and also with businesses from the Internet economy—in other words quite 
deliberately from within the political system, using the legal processes and other classic means 
associated with the latter (on general developments in the German case, see Beckedahl 2015, 
Ganz 2015). Possibly the most far-reaching manifestation of this opposition-politics is the Pirate 
Party, which has tried to make gains primarily by tackling genuinely Net-related issues and has 
managed to notch up a number of major successes inside various European political systems.xii 
The second strategy, which is linked to articulation and public education but is difficult to 
transpose adequately to the dissidence/opposition spectrum, is the creation of technical 
alternatives to the platforms and communications-mechanisms of the commercial Internet. In 
many cases, these products operate directly counter to the forces that engender order. The 
spectrum here extends from free and open-source software (well-known examples of which are 
Linux and Firefox) (Coleman 2009, 2012, Kelty 2005), through alternative Internet platforms 
such as Indymedia (Kidd 2003, Winter 2008, Ludlow 2001, Milan 2013a) and collaborative 
endeavours such as Wikipedia (Benkler 2013), to communications-resources such as TOR. Many 
of these structures are deliberately decentralised and aim to preclude, or actively impede, the 
operation of both state-based and commercial surveillance-mechanisms.xiii Despite this, the great 
majority of these activities are not perceived as dissidence or criminalised as such. In fact, they 
have a firm place in the developing digital universe, because many of the ‘enclaves’ in question 
act as important motors for innovation and in some cases supply common goods. By contrast, 
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projects that aim more deliberately at the anonymisation and encryption of communications are 
seen much more often as having criminal overtones. One example here is peer-to-peer networks, 
which are widely viewed as criminal on account of their role in file-sharing; another is the TOR 
encryption software, which, though developed and supported partly with government funds, has 
been increasingly criticised over the last few years—for example, for helping to facilitate illegal 
activities such as drugs- and arms-trafficking—and has therefore been subject to attempts to 
infiltrate or actually ban it (Moore/Rid 2016). 
Not until we go beyond oppositional Internet politics and the creation of alternative 
technologies do we find dissidence in the stricter sense, as a mode of challenging hegemonial 
political actors and norms through actions that fall outside the established rules of the game. In 
general terms, this kind of dissidence can be summed up under the rubric of ‘hacktivism.’ More 
specifically, it can be divided into three core types: the practice of leaking; blockade strategies 
such as ‘Ddosing’ that function like collective forms of protest; and forms such as hacking that 
are aimed directly at altering virtual environments. 
 Leaking or leaktivism (White 2016) is a mode of challenge in which material from inside 
an organisation is made public in an attempt to produce a political effect. It is closely 
akin to whistleblowing but is, as it were, given an added boost by digitalisation in the 
sense that disclosure of material is easier and can be achieved even without the 
involvement of gatekeepers. Above all, the quantity of leakable documents has increased 
thanks to digital storage, and at the same time the cost and effort involved in copying 
data have declined sharply. Leaking presupposes access to an organisation, either in the 
form of an internal source or via enforced entry from outside. In the wake of the 
WikiLeaks and Snowden affairs, leaking has come to be seen in a largely positive light 
and its image is that of an effective ‘emergency resort’ against increasingly hard-line 
institutions (for an overview of leaking and the discussion surrounding it, see, for 
example, Benkler 2011, de Lagasnerie 2016, Lovink/Riemens 2013, Pozen 2013, 
Greenberg 2012). 
 DDoSing (distributed denial-of-service attack) is here cited as a stand-in for the kinds of 
digital protest-actions that aim to replicate the effects of real-world demonstrations—in 
other words, that look to create the combined impression of broad-based support and 
blockading. In practical terms, DDoSing means the deliberate, targeted overloading of a 
server. It does not require access to an organisation and taking part is a relatively easy 
and widely accessible process. It came to fame notably as the tactical method of choice 
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of the Anonymous group (on DDoSing and other essentially digital protest-practices, see 
Sauter 2014, McCaughey/Ayers 2003, Milan 2013b, 2013c).xiv 
 Hacking, the last category here, has a much higher technical content.xv The term denotes 
the unauthorised and unscheduled modification of the functions of particular digital 
artefacts and often implies unauthorised access. Because it aims at fundamental change 
rather than surface protest or the enforcement of transparency, there are almost no 
bounds to the creativity of this kind of protest (on the persona of the hacker and on 
hacking as a strategy or form of protest, see, for example, Funken 2010, Hempel 2015, 
Jordan 2008, Powell 2016, Himanen 2004). 
One thing common to all three of these forms of hacktivism is that they generate a lot of 
interest. In both general and scholarly debate, they are very often construed as practices from, or 
successors to, civil disobedience. This is because in many cases their choice of means in itself 
conveys what is at issue and their performative breaches of the law point up the inadequacy of 
the existing order and/or indicate alternatives (on the question of whether digital disobedience is 
civil disobedience, see, for example: Celikates 2015, Kleger/ Makswitat 2014, Scheuermann 
2014, Züger 2014, Züger/Milan/Tanczer 2015). Although, as a result, all three variants are 
credited with a high degree of legitimacy in public debate, they are also subject to a high degree 
of criminalisation (a study published by the German Federal Criminal Police Office conveys the 
general idea here: Bundeskriminalamt 2015; see also the critical response to some of the findings 
in Haase/Züger 2015). Manifestations of this criminalisation include: the institution—or 
threat—of legal proceedings and the imposition of long prison-sentences if conviction ensues 
(the cases of Edward Snowden, Julian Assange, and the netzpolitik’ bloggers André Meister and 
Markus Beckedahl illustrate the first practice, the fate of Chelsea Manning the second); unequal 
legal treatment of virtual blockades/protests and their real-world equivalents (an early but 
memorable case of this involved the online protest against Lufthansa’s deportation-practice: 
Kartenberg 2011; also Gertheiss in this volume); particular zeal in the prosecution of hackers; 
and the especially harsh penalties imposed under relevant legislation (one example of which is 
the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, applied, for example, in the case of Aaron Swartz: 
Peters 2016). 
Having reviewed the political convictions and different strategies and permutations of digital 
dissidence, we are in a position to broach the question—raised in the introduction to the present 
volume—of what motivates dissidence. The answer, in the case of digital dissidence, seems to be 
that identity-related factors (dissidence by choice) and external labelling (dissidence by ascription) 
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play equal parts. The players in question take care to stage their dissidence in highly visible ways 
and they deliberately exploit media interest in order to get attention for their causes.xvi As a result, 
they have succeeded in making the creeping regulation of the Net described in the first part of 
this chapter into a political issue. Because of the actions of digital dissidents, the idea that there is 
no alternative to the current technical and commercial development of the Net no longer 
prevails. Instead, the emancipatory promise of digitalisation has been reawakened and has 
secured a key place for itself in the public debate. This being so, self-stylisation as dissident 
should here be seen primarily as identity- and norm-related. Self-reinforcing dynamics also play 
an important role, but interest-based explanations, by contrast, are of very little relevance when it 
comes to accounting for the motives of the dissenting camp in this particular policy-area. 
Another point to note is that in the field of  digital policy there is no transition from opposition 
to dissidence. Instead, there is a simultaneous upsurge in both, operating as complementary 
strategies. Acts of  digital dissidence have a reinforcing, boosting effect and are deliberately used 
by oppositional actors as a way of  creating awareness. Hence, dissidence is not excluded from 
discourse by oppositional actors but actively defended and justified. Meanwhile, as the arguments 
hot up, the opposing camp engages in deliberate denigration and criminalisation. The order 
currently entrenching itself  on the Internet adopts a strongly exclusionary attitude to its critics, 
portraying divergent norms and platforms as problematic and presenting legal oppositional 
strategies as endangering security. 
Order and dissidence: Why we got to where we are 
The present case-study differs somewhat from the others in this book in that, when it comes to 
digital policy, it is not possible to classify the struggles over order, as they currently stand, as 
straight successes or failures. This area of  policy is still too young for that, its themes are too 
varied and multi-layered, and the different stances and alliances need time to establish themselves. 
Another distinctive feature is that the side with the greater resources, which is seeking to 
transpose the status quo of  the non-digital world in as wholesale a form as possible to digital 
environments, does not enjoy an ‘incumbency bonus’ and has, by its own efforts, to demonstrate 
the plausibility of  its regulatory ambitions and push these through amidst great scepticism and in 
the face of  numerous kinds of  resistance. The politicisation and polarisation of  digital policy is 
thus pursued from two sides; it is not a case of  dissenting actors facing an adamantine order. 
This also means that digital dissidents occupy a special position, particularly in regard to public 
recognition and legitimacy, and can claim a number of  sometimes far-reaching successes in the 
sphere of  practical policy.xvii Although digital policy must be viewed overall as a fiercely contested 
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and extremely ill-defined domain, its core dynamics are nonetheless amenable to description 
according to the classificatory scheme developed for the present book. 
Features of  the normative context 
With regard to the significance of  norm characteristics, we should begin by noting that in the 
case under investigation here it was not one, more or less solidly identifiable, norm that was 
under scrutiny but a meshwork of  norms—in fact, a whole policy-area. In-depth study of  
individual norms such as Internet neutrality or censorship would produce more concrete results. 
This means that the type of  norm conflict is, likewise, not very easy to isolate: in the field 
examined here, conflicts of  interpretation and fundamental clashes between norms crop up in 
equal measure. That said, the overwhelming majority of  the disputes outlined here would have to 
be classed as clashes of  principle—a fact which helps to explain the impassioned nature of  the 
argument and the irreconcilability of  the various positions. 
Key to the explanation in the case analysed here, however, is the third aspect of  the normative 
context identified as causally relevant in the book’s introduction, namely institutional 
particularities. Specifically, the absence of  robust institutions—in other words, bodies with the 
power to make decisions and the ability to respond to interventions—often prevents public 
demands, even those that are viewed as legitimate and enjoy strong support, from being realised. 
The field of  digital policy is characterised by an enormous degree of  transnationality and in the 
area of  positive regulation in particular cooperation (including, quite regularly, with commercial 
actors) is unavoidable. The power of  civil-society actors has, it is true, found expression in a 
proliferation of  deliberative forums (the UN-convened two-stage World Summit on the 
Information Society, and the Internet Governance Forum that was set up in its wake, are 
examples of  this). However, when it comes to anything beyond highly technical standard-setting, 
and particularly where substantive issues relating to the regulation of  cyberspace are concerned, 
the internal weaknesses of  these institutions, and, even more importantly, the problems 
associated with enforcing positions agreed within them, are such that the chances of  
participation are slight (Dany 2012). As a result, digital dissidence continues to be at its most 
successful when it is geared to national—or, in the case of  the European Union, regional—
arenas. Even here, however, getting policies enforced poses an ongoing problem.xviii 
Actor characteristics and strategies 
As far as the digital dissident line-up is concerned, the professionalism, organisation, and 
connectivity of  its members indicate that we are dealing with a highly organised and efficient 
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civil-society phenomenon. The sphere of  Internet policy boasts a number of  well-established 
and now well-tried transnational alliances; actors here have the ability to generate media publicity 
for their causes; and the level of  organisational capacity in this domain would have to be classed 
as high (one study that throws light on skills-acquisition and efficiency in this area—but also on 
weaknesses—is Bennett’s in-depth study of  privacy advocates: Bennett 2008). Odd groups, 
particularly at this dissident end of  the spectrum, are less well organised and connected, but they 
are greatly helped by the technology available to them to network and organise protests. Thus, 
even isolated whistleblowers have been able to prevail against state and commercial actors and 
draw on broad-based support-networks which, for example, organise physical demonstrations or 
ensure media awareness. Needless to say, resources here are always limited and initiatives that are 
seeking not only to devise but also to realise practical alternatives are dependent on high inputs 
of  money and personnel that are constantly having to be replenished. The result is that even 
actors of  some status in the broader Internet economy—those, for example, on the Free and 
Open Source Software scene—are reliant on donations, which, in their turn, wax and wane very 
much according to the popularity of  the issues in question. Alliances with the commercial 
Internet economy are sometimes also of  importance here. 
The domain of  strategies and means has already been explored in some detail above. An obvious 
recurrent feature here is the ability of  digital dissidence to call upon a wide-ranging and in some 
cases novel repertoire of  approaches. Apart from bringing with it a number of  strategic 
advantages, this facility helps to explain the huge public interest in this area. One particularly 
important element, in addition to the previously mentioned alliance-building within—but also 
beyond—the civil-society scene, is the successful framing of  issues. Questions relating to 
digitalisation and Internet regulation are necessarily abstract and in public discourse they have to 
be discussed via metaphors and analogies. As a result, the battle over imaginaries assumes 
particular importance (Singh 2013; an overview of  state strategies aimed at shaping the 
conceptual landscape is given in Kamis/Thiel 2015). Dissident actions such as the Snowden 
leaks have, in their turn, played a major and discourse-defining role in upping the visibility of  
particular issues. As regards consistency of  position in different cases and across time, this is 
generally a given in the sphere of  digital dissidence and is reinforced as the debate intensifies. 
Contextual change 
External developments obviously play a major role in the field of  Internet policy, as elsewhere, 
and they do so both in the form of  unexpected events and as a continuous process of  
technological change. Thus, the security discourse that flares up after every terrorist attack is 
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undoubtedly a crucial factor in pressing home pro-regulation points of  view. The debates about 
the restriction or infiltration of  encryption, about mandatory registration, and about the 
redirection of  resources to surveillance-players, for example, are directly connected to events and, 
what is more, become a permanent feature even if  they prove ineffective. (This is true, for 
example, of  the perennial debate about data-retention that resurfaces in Germany after every 
terrorist attack and seems to survive even the highest-level legal rulings.) More important still, 
however, is the influence of  technological and commercial change, because such transformation 
shapes the policy-field itself  at a fundamental level. The development of  the mobile Internet, for 
example, has created entirely new possibilities as regards the collection and monitoring of  
locational data; and the commodification of  the Internet and the establishment of  data-based 
business-models have dramatically increased the need for political regulation. We should, 
however, be warned against the kind of  technological determinism that currently pervades 
discussion about the Net. Such a position will not bear closer scrutiny, either in its progressive 
version (networks as an irresistible force that will ultimately transform hierarchical and capitalist 
arrangements or render these obsolete—see Shirky 2008 and, for a more nuanced account, 
Castells 2004 and 2010) or in its fatalistic permutation (Enzensberger 2014). Besides this, it 
ignores the many and varied opportunities we have to shape and influence the ‘fourth revolution’ 
that is currently enveloping us in so many different ways (Floridi 2014). 
Conclusion 
As a case-study, digital dissidence has turned out to be intriguing and enlightening in equal 
measure. Because norm-building in the field of digital policy is an unfinished and much-
contested project, individual explanatory factors stand out clearly. It turns out that the 
protagonists of Internet policy have built up a considerable capacity for action and for pressing 
home their point of view. This in turn helps to explain the high degree of public legitimacy 
enjoyed by the causes these actors champion, and examination of individual conflicts often 
shows it to be a determining factor. At the same time, contextual changes (particularly 
technological developments and the marketisation of information and communications 
technologies) combined with the distinctive structural character of a policy-area equipped with 
only weak transnational institutions militate against the translation of ideas—even if widely 
shared—into concrete policies. Overall, then, the dynamics in this area of policy indicate that 
resistance is likely to become fiercer, with the emergent order being perceived as both gaining in 
strength and largely unresponsive. For civil-society actors in the field of Internet policy, 
therefore, the creation or refinement of political institutions that can make any kind of effective 
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policy possible will continue to be a vital consideration. Such institutions—which must therefore 
also be responsive—are, after all, a prerequisite if the actors in question are to see the high levels 
of legitimacy enjoyed by their ideas translated into concrete policies. The strategy of building up 
alternative forms of communication and exchange, and of maintaining or developing existing 
projects, will also play a part in determining the success or failure of digital dissidence. With this 
in mind, the essentially open architecture of the Internet must be preserved, because it is a 
precondition for the design of independent communications-platforms. However, this open 
architecture is not in itself a guarantee of success—as the cyber-utopians of the nineties rather 
too hastily assumed. To this extent, the politicisation of Internet policy has been a logical 
development. The next few years will show us along what lines our communicative norms and 
possibilities will develop and what kind of digital order will prevail. 
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i There are at least two other, equally key, notions of the Internet: as a space for communication (an idea I 
look at in greater detail later on) and as a physical structure (An overview of the different concepts and 
their implications is given in Crawford 2007.) Although the second view is playing an increasingly 
important role in the control of the Internet (DeNardis 2012, Musiani et al. 2016), it is only dealt with 
indirectly here. 
ii There is currently much discussion as to how far we are experiencing the return of closed spaces in this 
regard. What has triggered this debate is the appearance of ever more ‘closed gardens’, particularly in 
relation to the mobile Internet and its ‘restricted app’ logic and to access in developing countries, as 
exemplified in Facebook’s ‘internet.org’ initiative, which allows no-cost access to Internet services but 
only to specific ones. These changes to the Internet, and the various rationales underlying them, are 
discussed in e.g.: Weinberger 2015, Wu 2010, Zittrain 2009, Clark 2016, Timberg 2015. 
iii On closer analysis, two (complementary) processes are observable that represent a departure from the 
original multi-stakeholder model: transposition to multilateral institutions (internationalisation) and 
sharper definition of networks within the ‘network of networks’—the ‘fragmentation thesis’ (Drake/ 
Cerf/Kleinwächter 2016). 
iv Civil-society actors too have stinging criticisms to make of the present set-up and its institutional 
predecessors. The conclusions they draw, however, differ from the arguments advanced by the state and 
the corporate sector. Whereas to begin with a minimally regulated Internet was seen as a better guarantor 
of freedom on the Net, the defects in the security-architecture (Zittrain 2010) and the possibility of 
utilizing open protocols for commercial purposes have undermined this belief (Tufekci 2016). Hence, the 
idea of an increase in regulation is no longer rejected on principle and instead ways are sought of creating 
an institutional landscape that is more committed to freedom and more open to democratic influence. 
v This position is known by the name of ‘internet exceptionalism’ (Johnson/Post 1996) and received what 
was perhaps its most famous exposition in John Perry Barlow’s ‘Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace’ (Barlow 1996). Music- and software-piracy were early cautionary developments which 
seemed to demonstrate the inability of political sanctions or commercial clout to prevent the upheavals 
caused by the shift from analogue to digital formats and networks. 
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vi Those that derive particular benefit from digital juridification and order-formation often include—
speaking in particular of the state—executive bodies such as secret services. Ironically, these bodies 
themselves are subjected to very little legal regulation. On the contrary: they operate in a broad, loosely 
defined legal framework that both permits and ensures their expansion. Illustrations of this include the 
framing of objectives in very general terms, e.g. ‘countering terrorism’, and the definition of a task in 
terms that are too vague or too narrow—as when the analysis of communications-content is regulated but 
analysis of meta-data has no limit imposed on it. As far as private actors are concerned, a renewed 
increase in sensitivity to issues of data collection and analysis is observable over the last decade, 
particularly in Europe. The paralysis that had resulted from the assumption that actors operating at global 
level could not be regulated is beginning to wear off. Parliaments and courts of law in particular have set 
new trends here, identifying and enforcing regulations that curtail particularly far-reaching practices and in 
some cases have led to enhanced consumer-awareness. 
vii It is also clear that, overall, cyber dissidence is located almost exclusively at the left/progressive end of 
the political spectrum (Wolfson 2014). Naturally, there are also a good many right-wing and nationalist 
movements that actively exploit Internet networking or use it as a way of doing politics. However, this 
‘right-wing’ activity does not relate to issues of norm-development or regulation on the Net; it merely 
uses the Net as a means of tackling non-digital concerns. 
viii  Only in a very few cases are the demands so radical that they fall outside the bounds of the 
fundamental consensus that obtains in Western states. In this regard, Julian Assange, for example, is 
something of a chameleon: there are certainly writings by him that break radically with the notion of 
statehood and the possibility of representative democracy—see Assange 2006, and, for more general 
anarchistic observations, Shantz/Tomblin 2014. Having said that, we should bear in mind that Assange’s 
position, and the WikiLeaks notion of democracy, is ambiguous in places and has undergone several 
mutations. On this, see Assange 2010, Hofmann 2011, O’Hagan 2014, Sagar 2011. In essence, Assange 
assumes that, overall, technological developments provide better, i.e. more direct, opportunities for 
influencing and participating in, politics but that the basis for this is the essential openness of all decision-
making bodies. The broader Internet discourse also includes libertarian voices, which seek to extend the 
principles of free expression and absolute transparency not only to public institutions but also to private 
activities. defending trolling as a form of freedom of expression, for example, or attempting to hallow 
unfiltered leaking with an air of moral or political rectitude. The best known instance of this is the Ashley 
Madison hacking episode (Mansfield-Devine 2015). Within the public discourse, numerous voices have 
been raised against the transparency ideal, often taking the form of literary/fictional treatments of the 
theme. Jonathan Franzen’s Purity, for example, or Dave Eggers’s The Circle, predict totalitarian 
consequences for society as a whole. 
ix One can probably also draw a distinction here between an American and a European Internet culture. 
The former is much more influenced by Californian ideology and the culture of Silicon Valley, with its 
mixture of libertarian and 1960s counter-culture stances. (The classic critique of this mix was formulated 
early on by Barbrook and Cameron (1996). For a general account of developments, see Turner 2006.) The 
European position is less tied to business and permeated to a greater degree by a culture of data-
protection (on the cultural differences in general, and on status within the social system, see Elliot 2016). 
x  Examples of activism that is Net-based but not Net-related include the WikiLeaks publications 
regarding Iraq and Afghanistan. They also include many of the ‘Anonymous’ group’s actions, in which the 
choice of means is Internet-related but the substance at issue is not. (The interplay between Net-related 
and general opposition is explored in Kahn/Keller 2005.) A case in point was Project Chanology, which 
sought to challenge the Church of Scientology and played a key role in politicizing the group. Here too, 
however, there was a crucial digital connection, namely the attempt by the Church to have a video of 
Tom Cruise—one of its members—removed from the Internet (excellent descriptions of the evolution 
and politicisation of Anonymous are given in Coleman 2014 and Olson 2014). 
xi The digital dissidence described here is largely a phenomenon of Western liberal societies. Dissidents in 
authoritarian regimes do share many of the ideals in question, and in some cases use similar means; 
however, given the repressive context, the efforts to get the right to freedom of expression and other 
Internet standards accepted are more of a means to an end. Equally, under an authoritarian regime, much 
smaller acts are required to turn opposition into dissidence. In general, one should take care not to 
construe information and communications technologies one-sidedly as ‘liberation technologies’. One has 
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to weigh up what instruments and opportunities also find their way into the hands of the state as a result 
of the expansion of the digital sphere (on this debate, see: Morozov 2011, Deibert/Rohozinski 2010, 
Deibert 2013, Howard 2010). 
xii Interestingly, in this case the name of the party itself constitutes a call to dissidence. Also, battles 
against copyright-provisions (and thus also indirectly against the liberal system of property ownership) 
have had a high profile in the party’s country of origin—Sweden. 
xiii  The passing of technical expertise to non-expert users in order to make these open structures 
accessible (CrytoParty is one such initiative) must be included in these activities. Much of what is done by 
classic hacker-organisations—the CCC, for instance—comes under the development, deployment, and 
dissemination of an open infrastructure in a way that does not seek confrontation with the 
commercial/political shaping of the digital order (Kubitschko 2015). 
xiv  As well as these forms of online protest, there are many net-based but non-disruptive kinds (e-
petitions, for example, which come in for frequent use at the oppositional end of the spectrum—see Earl 
2006 and Earl/Kimport 2011). 
xv It is important to bear in mind that hacking does not necessarily have a political component and is 
instead pursued out of technical curiosity, say, or for fun (or indeed may actually be done exclusively or 
chiefly for these reasons) (Turgeman-Goldschmidt 2005). One reason why hacking has become 
increasingly politicised is because the ontology of digital communication has undergone a change and 
what was once a mode of play for experts has turned into a heavily regulated area of human action 
deemed to be of crucial social importance (Nissenbaum 2004). 
xvi It would be instructive at this point to look a little further afield and consider the kinds of world-views 
that are associated with digital dissidence—views that appear to play an important part in recruiting new 
activists and maintaining the digital-dissidence movement in society. Popular culture’s fascination with 
digital dissidence is evident. It finds expression in admiring narratives about hackers—in the ‘Mr Robot’ 
television series, for example, and in countless feature films. Iconic images of columns of green figures 
and successions of programme codes flashing past elevate computer-expertise to the realms of wizardry. 
At the same time, these admiring accounts always have an undertone of considerable ambivalence, partly 
because they convey the feeling that anything may happen, that there is no control, and partly because the 
hacker is often portrayed as a loner and an unstable person. 
xvii One example of successful endeavour by civil-society actors that remains as telling as ever is the series 
of so-called ‘crypto wars’ conducted during the 1990s. As a result of these, comprehensive and accessible 
systems of coding were made available to end-users in the face of strong reservations on the part of 
political actors. This example also shows, however, that the successes achieved by the Internet movement 
need constant safeguarding: the Snowden leaks make clear just how keen secret services are to undermine 
encryption standards (Kehl/Bankston. 2015, Diffie/Landau 2007). Similarly, the discussions about ‘back 
doors’ and ‘golden keys’ in commercial applications demonstrate that the ideal of control-averse network-
structures faces strong resistance from both the state and, to some extent, business, meaning that norm-
formation must be viewed as an incomplete and contested project. 
xviii This is clear from the case of data-protection. Thus, the successful challenges mounted against the 
‘Safe Harbour’ arrangement both in the courts and in parliament seem at first sight to signal victory, but 
the updated version of the instrument, entitled ‘Privacy Shield’, contains as many major implementation-
problems as ever and these are explained—at least by the actors involved in the negotiations—as being 
due to the impossibility of pushing through any broader-based agreements. 
